Identification of the effects of the law of guarantees on the Colombian electoral process: an analysis from the perspective of territorial contracting

Abstract

The Law of Guarantees, issued by the Congress of the Republic of Colombia in 2005, seeks to restrict the contracting capacity of the National and territorial governments during electoral campaigns, prohibiting direct contracting and inter-administrative agreements to avoid the use of public resources for electoral purposes. This paper analyzes the effects of the Law of Guarantees on state contracting by territorial entities, using data from the Information System of the General Audit Office of the Republic, which includes approximately 3.2 million public contracts registered between January 2016 and October 2021. The findings indicate that the Law of Guarantees does not impact the behavior of territorial contracting in any selection modality. Neither the aggregate monthly sum of contracting values nor the number of contracts are affected by the Law. One possible explanation is that the territorial political class has learned to smooth public spending throughout the fiscal year, appearing to comply with the law. This conclusion is supported by testimonial and criminological evidence on the ability of territorial political elites to simulate regulatory compliance.