Private contributions to electoral campaigns in Colombia: political affinity or short-term investment?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.70254/controlvisible.2022.2.13Keywords:
Campaign finance, State contracting , regional elections, difference-in-differences modelsAbstract
How do political campaigns financing and the subsequent election of their candidates affect decisions in state hiring? Donors’ resources are one of the most important sources of financing for public office candidates in Colombia, this could mean an additional form of citizen participation or an investment to later contract with the state. This paper analyzes the impact of financing successful electoral campaigns on the number of contracts subsequently obtained by their financiers. To this end, information was obtained on state contractors, in the periods 2012-2015 and 2016-2019, who contributed to campaigns in the framework of the 2015 regional elections. From the use of a difference-in-differences model, a significant increase in the number of total contracts obtained by campaign financiers whose candidates were winners was evidenced, as well as those modalities with simple and manipulable contracting processes, especially in the year following the election.
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